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Structural adjustment, as measured by the number of adjustment loans from the IMF
and World Bank, reduces the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Growth does
reduce poverty, but I find no evidence for a direct effect of structural adjustment on
growth. Instead, the poor benefit less from output expansion in countries with many
adjustment loans than in countries with few adjustment loans. By the same token, the
poor suffer less from an output contraction in countries with many adjustment loans
than in countries with few adjustment loans. Higher adjustment lending seems to act in
a way similar to higher inequality in lowering the stake of the poor in aggregate growth.
Why would this be? One hypothesis that adjustment lending is counter-cyclical in ways
that smooth consumption for the poor. There is evidence that some policy variables
under adjustment lending are counter-cyclical, but there is no evidence that the cyclical
component of those policy variables affects poverty. I speculate that the poor may be ill-
placed to take advantage of new opportunities created by structural adjustment reforms,
just as they may suffer less from the loss of old opportunities in sectors that were
artificially protected prior to reforms.
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Introduction
Poverty reduction is in the news for both the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF website
says
In September 1999, the objectives of the IMF's concessional lending were
broadened to include an explicit focus on poverty reduction in the context of a
growth oriented strategy. The IMF will support, along with the World Bank,
strategies elaborated by the borrowing country in a Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP).1
For its part, the World Bank headquarters has built into its lobby wall the slogan ‘our
dream is a world free of poverty.’ The recent East Asian currency crisis and its aftershocks
in other countries generated intense concern about how the poor were faring under
structural adjustment programmes supported by the Bank and the Fund. The poverty issue
is so red-hot that IMF and World Bank staff began to feel that every action inside these
organizations, from reviewing public expenditure to vacuuming the office carpet, should be
justified by its effect on poverty reduction. At the same time, there has been a long
standing criticism from the left of Bank and Fund structural adjustment programmes as
disproportionately hurting the poor:
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank arrive in southern
countries, corporate profits go up, but so do poverty and suffering. Decades of
promises that just a little more ‘short-term’ pain will bring long-term gain have
exposed the IMF and World Bank as false prophets whose mission is to protect
those who already control too much wealth and power.2
A report published today by the World Development Movement (WDM) shows that
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) new Poverty Reduction Strategies are
acting as barriers to policies benefiting the world’s poorest people.3
Many developing countries suffered ... sustained increases in prosperity,
accompanied by dramatic increases in inequality and child poverty ... under the
auspices of IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes.4
In country after country, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have reversed
the development successes of the 1960s and 1970s, with ... millions sliding into
poverty every year. Even the World Bank has had to accept that SAPs have failed
the poor, with a special burden falling on women and children. Yet together with
the IMF it still demands that developing countries persist with SAPs.5
1 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm.




This paper examines the effect of IMF and World Bank adjustment lending on poverty
reduction. I briefly examine the effect of IMF and World Bank adjustment lending on
growth and find no effect (suitably instrumenting for adjustment lending), which is in line
with the previous long and inconclusive literature. My main result is that IMF and World
Bank adjustment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty, that is the amount of
change in poverty rates for a given amount of growth. This means that economic
expansions benefit the poor less under structural adjustment, but at the same time
economic contractions hurt the poor less. What could be the mechanisms for such a result?
There could be several possible explanations. I first speculate that IMF and World Bank
conditionality may be less austere when lending occurs during an economic contraction,
while conditionality may require more macro adjustment during an expansion. If macro
adjustment disproportionately hurts the poor—say because fiscal adjustment, for example,
is implemented through increasing regressive taxes like sales taxes or decreasing
progressive spending like transfers—then we get the result that IMF and World Bank
adjustment lending lowers the growth elasticity of poverty. Adjustment lending could even
include an explicit fiscal insurance mechanism such as an increase in subsidies that
cushions the effect of contractions on the poor, but accompanied by a reduction in
subsidies in times of expansion. We can test this hypothesis explicitly by evaluating the
behavior of fiscal policy and macro policy variables during expansions and contractions,
with or without adjustment lending.
A nearly opposite hypothesis is that IMF and World Bank conditionality may itself cause
an expansion or contraction in aggregate output—depending on the composition of the
structural adjustment package—but not affect the poor very much. This view would see the
poor as mainly deriving their income from informal sector and subsistence activities, which
are not affected much by fiscal policy changes or adjustments in macro policies. Structural
adjustment packages usually imply some previously favored formal sector activities must
contract while other formal sector activities newly favored can expand. The net effect may
be overall contraction or expansion, depending on the initial sizes of the declining and
expanding sectors and the specific policy measures in the structural adjustment package.
However, if the poor are not tightly linked to either the expanding or the contracting formal
sector, then the amount of poverty change for a given amount of output change may not be
very high under structural adjustment. An expansion or contraction in the absence of
adjustment lending, on the other hand, may reflect economy-wide factors that lift or sink
all boats. I will not be able to test this hypothesis directly because of lack of comparable
data on the size of the informal sector and its incidence among the poor, but I offer it as a
backup hypothesis in case the first hypothesis fails.
1. Data and concepts for the paper
I have data for 1980-98 on all types of IMF lending and on World Bank adjustment
lending. IMF lending includes stand-bys, extended arrangements, structural adjustment
facilities, and enhanced structural adjustment facilities (recently renamed Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facilities). The latter two kinds of operations are concessional for
low-income countries. World Bank adjustment lending includes structural adjustment
loans, sectoral structural adjustment loans, and structural adjustment credits (the latter is
concessional for low-income countries). The data are reported in the year that the loans are3
approved. Hence, my data take the form of number of new Bank and Fund adjustment
loans approved each year. It would be preferable to have data that record also how long
these loans are in effect, but the data are unfortunately not available in this format. For any
time period I consider in this paper, I consider the average number of new Bank and Fund
adjustment loans per year.
Conditionality associated with these loans is well-known: macroeconomic conditions like
reducing budget deficits, devaluation, and reducing domestic credit expansion, and
structural conditions like freeing controlled prices and interest rates, reducing trade
barriers, and privatizing state enterprises. Although the Fund is associated more with the
former and the Bank with the latter, in practice neither will proceed with an adjustment
loan unless the other is satisfied with progress on ‘its’ area of responsibility.
For data on poverty, I use an updated version of Ravallion and Chen's (1997) database on
poverty spells. These authors were careful to choose spells and countries where the
definition of poverty was constant and comparable over time and across countries. The
source of the data is household surveys. They report the proportion of the population that is
poor at the poverty line of $2 per day at the beginning of the spell and the end of the spell
(they also report the poverty rates for a poverty line of $1 per day, but I choose to use the
former because many countries have a 0 initial value at $1 per day). They also report the
Gini coefficients at the beginning and the end, and the mean income in the household
survey at the beginning and the end. They report data on 155 spells for 65 developing
countries (the Appendix table gives the countries and numbers of spells each). The spells
are quite short (median length 3 years), and so I interpret them more as cyclical
fluctuations in mean consumption and poverty rather than as long-run tendencies in growth
and poverty reduction. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for all the data:
Table 1










Mean 6.0% -1.1% 39.5 41.2 0.62
Median -0.1% 0.0% 39.5 36.3 0.50
Std. Dev. 31.5% 11.1% 11.1 29.6 0.60
Observations 149 155 155 154 150
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.
2. Results on adjustment lending and poverty reduction
Following Ravallion (1997), I regress the change in poverty rate on growth of mean
income and the interaction of growth of mean income with the Gini coefficient. The idea of
this specification is that if the poor have a low share in existing income (high Gini), they
will likely have a low share in newly created income (low growth elasticity of poverty
reduction). I also include the level of the initial Gini for completeness. To test the effect of4
IMF and World Bank adjustment lending, I include the variable measuring number of
adjustment loans per year during the poverty spell and also interact this variable with
growth.
There is the well known selection bias problem with World Bank and IMF lending. This
lending goes to countries that are in trouble, and this trouble could include initial high
poverty rates. We could even imagine that World Bank and IMF programmes go to
countries who are more likely to reduce poverty rapidly. With these concerns in mind, I
instrument for World Bank and IMF lending. I follow the practice of the foreign aid
literature in using dummies that measure friends of influential donors, including a dummy
for Central America, one for Egypt, and one for Franc Zone countries. I also include
continent dummies as instruments for lending, because both the World Bank and IMF have
a different department for each continent, and these different departments may have
different propensities to make loans. I also include initial income as an instrument of
adjustment loan frequency.
With the same set of instruments, I also tested the direct effect of adjustment lending on
growth, not controlling for any other factors. In line with a long and inconclusive literature,
I found no systematic effect of adjustment lending on growth. (A recent paper by
Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 reviews the long inconclusive literature on the IMF, while
they themselves find a negative effect controlling for selection bias. Some internal Bank
and Fund studies have found positive effects of their programmes on growth. I do not
intend to make the effect of structural adjustment on growth a major focus of the paper,
since structural adjustment would of course alleviate poverty if it raised growth and worsen
it if it lowered growth.) Of course, behind this zero average result is concealed a set of
expansions and contractions that depended in part on the particulars of the adjustment
programme in each country and time period.
In general, we would expect that an adjustment programme would disfavour some sectors
that were previously artificially protected or subsidized, and favor other sectors that benefit
from a change in relative prices in their favour. Whether expansion or decline dominates
depends in part on the relative sizes of the expanding and declining sectors (as pointed out
by Rauch, 1997). The result on expansions strongly reducing the rate of poverty—or output
crises raising the rate of poverty—is familiar from other studies (Ravallion and Chen,
1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2000; Bruno et al., 2000; Lustig, 2000; Ravallion, 2000). Without
controlling for other variables, the mean growth elasticity of poverty is about 1.9 (Table 2).
The significant coefficient on the interaction term between the Gini coefficient and the
growth rate also confirms the Ravallion (1997) and Bruno et al. (2000) result (Table 2).
Ten percentage points higher Gini will lower the growth elasticity of poverty by 0.6
percentage points. A not-often-noticed implication of this result is that the poor will be hurt
less by output contraction in a highly unequal economy than in a relatively equal one,
simply because the poor have a low share of output to begin with. The initial Gini also has
a direct negative effect on the change in poverty, suggesting a reversion to greater equality
if a country begins highly unequal.5
The new result in this paper is that, while adjustment lending has no direct effect on
poverty reduction, it has a strong interaction effect with economic growth (Table 2).6 The
absolute value of the growth elasticity of poverty declines by about 2 points for every
additional IMF or World Bank adjustment loan per year. The results are strong either in
OLS or instrumenting for World Bank and IMF programmes with the instruments shown.
This means that the poor benefit less from expansions during a structural adjustment
programme than in expansions without an adjustment program, while they are at the same
time hurt less by contractions.
Table 2
Regression results on change in poverty, growth, and adjustment programmes









Regression 2 Regression 3
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 0.039 1.82 0.319 4.68 0.382 4.21
GROWTH -1.892 -8.24 -5.481 -8.27 -5.465 -4.61
GINI1 -0.006 -3.83 -0.006 -3.65
PROGRAM -0.019 -0.62 -0.116 -1.30
GROWTH*GINI1 0.058 3.27 0.057 2.68
GROWTH*PROGRAM 1.790 7.37 2.034 3.44
Included observations: 149 144 126
Instruments for PROGRAM: CENTAM EASIA EGYPT FRZ SSA LAC ECA GROWTH*CENTAM
GROWTH*EASIA GROWTH*FRZ GROWTH*EGYPT GROWTH*SSA GROWTH*GINI1
GROWTH*LAC GROWTH*ECA LGDPPC
Variable definitions
GROWTH Log rate of growth per annum in mean of household survey
GINI1 Initial Gini coefficient
PROGRAM Number of IMF/World Bank adjustment loans initiated per annum
CENTAM Dummy for Central America
FRZ Dummy for Franc Zone
EGYPT Dummy for Egypt and Israel
SSA Dummy for sub-Saharan Africa
LAC Dummy for Latin America
ECA Dummy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
EASIA Dummy for East Asia
LGDPPC Log of initial per capita income (Summers-Heston)
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.
6 IMF (1999) found that ‘In seven SAF/ESAF countries for which data are available, poverty rates declined
by an average of 20 percent under IMF-supported adjustment programs, implying an average annual
reduction of 5.3 percent’ This study did not control for mean growth.6
Expansion under adjustment lending is less pro-poor, while contraction under adjustment
lending is less anti-poor. The welfare of the poor may have increased from the income
smoothing effect of adjustment lending. On the other hand, it is disappointing that the poor
do not share fully in growth in those cases where there are recoveries that accompany
adjustment lending. Since the Bank and the Fund ultimately wish to restore growth in the
economies to which they make adjustment loans, it is worrisome that positive growth has
less of a poverty-reducing impact with high Bank-Fund involvement.
Figure 1 illustrates the results. Countries with a low level of adjustment lending (AL) as
measured by PROGRAMME and low inequality have both greater increases in poverty
during contraction and greater falls in poverty during expansions than do countries with a
high level of IMF and World Bank lending and high inequality. (High and low AL here
just mean the upper and lower 50% of the sample as measured by program; expansion is
the average of all increases in mean income while contraction is the average of all
decreases in mean income).
Figure 1
Contractions and expansions, with varying levels of inequality and adjustment lending
Another way of illustrating the weakened link between growth and poverty reduction with
high inequality and high adjustment lending is to calculate the number of perverse
outcomes in quartiles of the sample defined by high and low inequality and high and low
adjustment lending. A perverse outcome is defined as either a mean expansion with an
increase in poverty, or a mean contraction with a decrease in poverty. Such perverse
outcomes are rare except in the case when both inequality and adjustment lending are high,















































Probability of perverse poverty-growth outcomes depending on level of inequality and
adjustment lending
What is the marginal impact on poverty of IMF and World Bank adjustment loans? If we
specify a counterfactual of zero adjustment lending to all countries in the sample, we find
that the effect of the actual adjustment loans on the number of poor was a net increase of
14 million. This represents an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the population-weighted
average poverty rate in the sample. The outcome reflects the net effect of an increase in the
number of poor compared to the counterfactual of no adjustment loans in growing
countries like India and China, while there was a decrease in poverty compared to the
counterfactual in contracting countries like Russia and Ukraine. The unweighted median
change in the poverty rate associated with adjustment loans is 0.0.
Table 3
Poverty elasticities with respect to growth for different Gini coefficients and
adjustment loan intensity
Average number of adjustment loans per year during survey spell
GINI coefficient 0 0.5 1
30 -3.8 -2.7 -1.7
45 -2.9 -1.9 -0.9
60 -2.1 -1.0 0.0
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.
Table 3 uses the coefficients from regression (2) to calculate the poverty elasticity with
respect to growth at different levels of the Gini coefficient and adjustment loans per year
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reproduce the familiar elasticity of 2. However, there is great fluctuation around this
average for different measures of the Gini and AL. If there are no adjustment loans and
inequality is very low, then poverty is extremely elastic with respect to growth (3.8). China
in 1990-2 is an example of an observation that would approximately fall in this cell. At the
other extreme a highly unequal country receiving adjustment loans sees no effect of growth
or contraction on poverty. Colombia in 1995-6 is an example of a country that would
roughly fit in this cell.
I performed several robustness checks on these results. First, I looked for asymmetries
between expansion and contraction in both growth effects and the interaction term with
adjustment lending. I found no evidence for any asymmetries—the interaction term
between adjustment lending and growth remains statistically significant in the separate
samples of expansions and contractions.
Second, I added the initial poverty rate both in levels and as an interaction term. The initial
poverty rate enters with a negative sign in levels—indicating some tendency of poverty to
revert to the mean—but it leaves the significance of the interaction term between
adjustment lending and growth unchanged.
Third, I entered the mean household consumption from the household survey, both in
levels and as an interaction term with growth. It left the coefficient on the growth and
adjustment programme interaction unchanged in magnitude and significance, while the
mean household consumption was not significant either in levels or as an interaction term
with growth.
Table 4



























Indonesia 96-99 -4.3% 7.5% -1.73 50.51 63.21 36.45 1.0
Mexico 89-95 -1.9% 1.5% -0.81 38.80 42.47 55.14 1.0
Russia 96-98 -0.6% 1.3% -2.16 24.43 25.08 48.03 2.5
Thailand 96-98 -1.8% -0.2% 0.10 28.25 28.15 43.39 1.5
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.
Given all the interest in currency crises, I examine the 4 currency crisis cases that are in the
present sample: Mexico (1989-95), Indonesia (1996-9), Russia (1996-8), and Thailand
(1996-8). All of them had at least one adjustment loan per year during the period before
and during the crisis (Table 4). Growth was negative in all cases, but the increases in
poverty were fairly modest except for Indonesia. We should not make much out of 4
datapoints in a sample of 126 observations, but it's still interesting to see if we can explain
the differential poverty response to currency-output crises with the regression. We can
understand Mexico's low poverty-growth elasticity as reflecting its high inequality and its
receipt of adjustment loans. Thailand's near zero poverty-growth elasticity could be
rationalized as a consequence of its high adjustment intensity and its relatively average rate9
of inequality. Indonesia fits the story with a slightly below average elasticity associated
with low inequality but relatively intense adjustment lending. Russia is an outlier, with a
high elasticity despite an extraordinarily high number of adjustment loans per year.
3. Testing the counter-cyclicality of adjustment lending
One possible explanation for the poverty-smoothing effect of adjustment lending may be
that conditionality on macro adjustment is tougher during expansions than contractions,
since the Fund and Bank may fear deepening a contraction with excessive austerity. If the
poor disproportionately suffer from austerity, then in contractions they will suffer less for a
given rate of mean income decline while conversely they will do less well for a given rate
of growth in expansions. Second, the principal means of fiscal adjustment under
adjustment programmes during expansions may be through regressive taxation like sales
taxes, which lower the benefits to the poor of mean income growth. Third, Bank and Fund
lending programmes may explicitly include ‘social safety nets’ that cushion the effect of a
contraction on the poor, while these transfers may be reduced during expansions. I will
first test for counter-cyclicality of these variables, and then test their effect on the poverty
rate.
Table 5
Deviations of policy variables from long-run averages under expansions and















Macro policies (log deviations)
Black market premium -6.7% -7.3% -6.2% 5.4%
-1.61 -2.45 -1.09 0.94
Inflation -0.7% 0.4% 6.9% 6.3%
-0.72 0.21 2.63 0.61
Real exchange rate (negative
is depreciation)
-13.7% -4.1% -14.5% -0.3%
-4.90 -1.36 -3.68 -0.06
Real interest rate 0.0% 2.9% 2.5% -3.1%
0.02 0.94 0.64 -0.46
Fiscal policies (% of GDP)
Budget surplus 0.28 0.67 0.63 0.18
0.39 2.10 1.40 0.26
Transfers -0.57 0.00 0.86 -0.18
-1.94 0.01 2.44 -0.45
Taxes on domestic goods and
services
-0.12 0.32 -0.48 0.31
-0.63 1.84 -1.53 1.21
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.10
Table 5 test the counter-cyclicality of adjustment lending by presenting means of macro
and fiscal policy variables for quartiles of the sample divided between expansions and
contractions and between high and low adjustment lending. We find some evidence for
counter-cyclicality of adjustment lending. Inflation is above average during contractions
under high adjustment lending, suggesting conditions on monetary growth and domestic
credit expansion may be less tough if the economy is otherwise experiencing a contraction.
(There could also be reverse causation from above average inflation to economic
contraction, but then why does this not show up under low adjustment lending?) Most
interesting of all, transfers are significantly above average during contractions under
adjustment lending, while they are significantly below average during high-AL expansions;
there is no such counter-cyclical behavior of transfers under low adjustment lending. Other
macro and fiscal policy variables do not show significant deviations from the means in the
quartile subsamples.
Table 6
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Macro policies (log differences)
Black market
premium
0.01 58 -0.12 49 0.00 60 -0.13 47
0.11 -1.36 -0.06 -2.13
Inflation -0.01 67 0.01 54 -0.08 62 -0.06 59




-0.10 57 -0.14 47 0.01 56 -0.04 48
-2.31 -2.31 0.17 -0.70
Real interest rate -0.03 69 0.06 59 -0.02 64 0.06 64
-0.75 0.75 -0.56 0.89
Fiscal policies (percent of GDP)
Budget surplus -0.40 43 0.44 43 -0.35 41 0.49 45
-0.55 0.53 -0.43 0.64
transfers -0.57 42 1.05 42 -1.43 39 0.19 45
-1.46 1.94 -3.05 0.39
Taxes on domestic
goods or services
-0.44 43 -0.79 42 0.36 40 0.01 45
-1.69 -1.95 0.95 0.04
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.11
Table 6 does various tests of the equality of means across the quartiles displayed in Table
5. Under high adjustment lending, I confirm that inflation and transfers are significantly
higher under contractions than under expansions, again reinforcing the possibility of
countercylicality of monetary and fiscal policy under adjustment lending.
Table 7
Regression of poverty rate on possible mechanisms for poverty smoothing through
adjustment lending
Dependent Variable: Log change in poverty rate
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 0.010 1.00 0.006 0.64 0.020 1.46
GROWTH -5.086 -6.36 -4.252 -5.72 -7.654 -5.57
GINI1*GROWTH 0.076 4.35 0.055 3.20 0.127 4.21







Observations 99 91 65
Instrument list: C GROWTH GINI1 CENTAM EASIA EGYPT SSA
GROWTH*CENTAM GROWTH*EASIA GROWTH*EGYPT
GROWTH*SSA GROWTH*LAC GROWTH*FRZ GROWTH*ECA
LGDPPC LAC ECA FRZ LPOP GROWTH*LPOP GROWTH* Ancillary Variable
Ancillary Variable
New variables:
PIDEV Deviation of log inflation from average 1980-
98
BMPDEV Deviation of log black market premium from average 1980-98
TRANSFERS Deviation of transfers/GDP from average 1980-98
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank and IMF data.
There are something other interesting differences in means. The black market premium
moves counter-cyclically under low adjustment lending—low during expansions and high
during contractions. Causation here could run in both directions, but what is important for
the poor is the pattern of cyclical covariation. Adjustment lending eliminates this
countercylicality, which would tend to smooth consumption of the poor if they suffer
disproportionately from high black market premiums.
The other strong pattern that emerges is that adjustment lending is associated with a more
depreciated real exchange rate, regardless of whether mean consumption is expanding or
contracting. This is no doubt because devaluation is often a condition of IMF programs.12
There may also be reverse causation from currency collapses to the initiation of World
Bank and IMF adjustment loans. Devaluation itself may be expansionary or contractionary
(Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay, 2000), perhaps depending on the size of the initial current
account imbalance and the currency denomination of public and private debt relative to the
tradeables intensity of those who owe the debts.
So there is some evidence that adjustment lending has counter-cyclical effects in ways that
may smooth the consumption of the poor. But is there direct evidence that these effects
account for the lower growth elasticity of poverty under adjustment lending?
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find evidence that these policy variables are responsible for
smoothing poverty under adjustment lending. The three examples of variables for which
adjustment lending altered the cycle—inflation, the black market premium, and fiscal
transfers—do not show any direct effect on poverty, either directly or interacted with
growth (Table 7). Entering these variables leaves the interaction effect of growth and
adjustment lending on poverty unchanged.
Easterly and Fischer (2000) find some evidence that inflation increases poverty, when
inflation is measured in absolute terms rather than relative to country averages. They also
find that the poor are more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a top national
problem in opinion surveys. Because of the difference in methodology, I don't think the
results of Table 7 contradict the Easterly-Fischer results on the effects of inflation on
poverty. I interpret the inflation deviation as a measure of the cyclical component of
inflation which may be altered by IMF and World Bank adjustment lending. This cyclical
component of inflation doesn't seem to have an effect on the log change in the poverty rate,
in contrast to the negative effect of very high absolute inflation on the poor.
The message of Table 7 is consistent with the alternative hypothesis mentioned at the
beginning of the paper. The kind of macroeconomic and fiscal policy measures that the
Bank and Fund usually support may themselves cause an expansion or contraction in the
aggregate economy, depending on the composition of adjustment packages. But these
policies may not affect the poor very much because the poor derive much of their income
from the informal sector or subsistence production. The beneficiaries of government
transfers also may simply be the middle class rather than the poor. I do not test this
hypothesis directly, but I adduce a few illustrative bits of information. Table 8 shows the
share of the informal sector in urban employment in a variety of developing countries.
While there are many problems with the comparability and accuracy of such statistics, the
message of Table 8 seems to consistently be that the urban informal sector is large. It
seems likely that the rural informal sector would be even larger.
The last piece in the puzzle is showing that the poor derive much of their income from
informal and subsistence income. I offer a suggestive example from Zambia and Burkina
Faso in Table 9. Self-employment income is extremely important for the poorest deciles in
Zambia. The bias is less extreme in Burkina Faso, but the poorest still have their earnings
skewed towards self-employment income. These surveys are suggestive of the importance
of the informal sector for the poorest households, lending credence to the relative
insulation of the poor from structural adjustment measures.13
Table 8
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Source: ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market.
Lipton and Ravallion (1995: 2601) stress that there is considerable heterogeneity within the
urban informal sector, with an individual's poverty depending more on individual attributes
like human capital than on any economy-wide labor market distortion leading to the
creation of an informal sector. Other distortions may exclude the poor from taking
advantage of reforms under structural adjustment, like lack of access to credit. Van de
Walle 2000 shows evidence of lower return to formal sector investments (irrigation in her
specific example) for the less educated. The poor may be geographically isolated from the
formal sector economy, which may be exacerbated by poor infrastructure. Whatever the
distortion or initial endowment at work, the individuals who are poor may be ill-placed to
take advantage of new opportunities created by structural adjustment programs, just as they
may suffer less from the destruction of old opportunities enjoyed by protected sectors prior
to structural adjustment.
Table 9
Sources of income—percent share by income decile, from poorest to richest
Zambia Household Survey Burkina Faso HH Survey
Income Deciles Profits and self-
employment income




1 100% 0% 42% 58%
2 99% 1% 32% 68%
3 94% 6% 21% 79%
4 67% 33% 19% 81%
5 45% 55% 17% 83%
6 17% 83% 15% 85%
7 12% 88% 18% 82%
8 11% 89% 21% 79%
9 10% 90% 27% 74%
10 36% 64% 46% 54%
Source: Devarajan et al. (2000); Fofack (2000).15
4. Conclusions
The results in this paper are suggestive that IMF and World Bank adjustment lending
provides a smoothing of consumption for the poor, lowering the rise in poverty for a given
contraction, but also lowering the fall in poverty for a given expansion. Adjustment lending
seems to play a similar role to inequality, in lowering the sensitivity of poverty to the
aggregate growth rate of the economy.
The lower sensitivity of poverty to growth under adjustment lending is bad news during
expansions and good news during contractions. If we think of the normal steady state of
the economy as being one of positive growth, then adjustment lending is bad news for the
growing economy; it means the poor share less in the expansion of the economy. One
might think that adjustment lending happens only during non-steady-state output crises, but
adjustment lending has been so continuous for some economies, it is hard to speak of it as
purely a transitional phenomenon. From a political economy point of view, lowering the
sensitivity of poverty to the aggregate growth rate could be dangerous because it gives the
poor less of a stake in overall good economic performance. This might increase the support
of the poor for populist experiments at redistributing income. These results could be
interpreted to give support to either the critics or the supporters of structural adjustment
programs. To support the critics, growth under structural programmes is less pro-poor than
in economies not under structural adjustment programs. To back the supporters,
contractions under structural adjustment hurt the poor less than contractions not under
structural adjustment programs.
The question not fully resolved by this paper is: why does structural adjustment reduce the
sensitivity of poverty to growth? Although there is evidence that adjustment lending alters
the cycle for some policy variables, there is no evidence that these alterations affect
poverty. I speculate that the poor may be ill-placed to take advantage of new opportunities
created by structural adjustment reforms, just as they may suffer less from the loss of old
opportunities in sectors that were artificially protected prior to reforms.
Appendix Table:
Countries with poverty spells 1980-99 from Ravallion and Chen 1997





































































Source: Ravallion and Chen (1997).
References
Bruno, Michael, Martin Ravallion, and Lyn Squire (2000) ‘Equity and growth in
developing countries: old and new perspectives on the policy issues’, in A. Solimano, E.
Aninat, and N. Birdsall, Distributive Justice and Economic Development: the Case of
Chile and Developing Countries, University of Michigan: Ann Arbor.
Devarajan, Shanta et al. (2000) ‘A Macroeconomic Framework for Poverty Reduction
Strategies’ (mimeo) World Bank: Washington DC.
Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay (2000) ‘Growth is good for the poor’ (mimeo) World Bank:
Washington DC.
Easterly, William and Stanley Fischer (2000) ‘Inflation and the Poor’, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking.
Gupta, Poonam, Deepak Mishra, and Ratna Sahay (2000) ‘Output response during
currency crises’ (mimeo) IMF and World Bank: Washington DC.
International Monetary Fund (1999) The IMF and the Poor, Fiscal Affairs Department
Pamphlet Series No. 52,. IMF: Washington DC.
Lipton, Michael and Martin Ravallion (1995) ‘Poverty and Policy’, in Jere Behrman and
T.N. Srinivasan (eds) Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 3B: 2551-658.
Lustig, Nora (2000) ‘Crises and the Poor: Socially Responsible Macroeconomics’
Economia, Vol. I, No. 1, Brookings Institution: Washington DC.
Przeworski, Adam, and James Vreeland (2000) ‘The Effect of IMF Programmes on
Economic Growth,’ Journal of Development Economics, 62: 385-421.
Rauch, James (1997) ‘Balanced and Unbalanced Growth’, Journal of Development
Economics 53:41-66.
Ravallion, Martin (1997) ‘Can High-Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute
Poverty?’ Economics Letters; Vol. 56 September: 51-7.18
Ravallion, Martin (2000) ‘Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages’
(mimeo), World Bank: Washington DC.
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen (1997) ‘What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about
Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?’ The World Bank Economic Review Vol.
11, No. 2.
Van de Walle, Dominique (2000) ‘Are Returns to Investment Lower for the Poor? Human
and Physical Capital Interactions in Rural Vietnam’ World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2425, World Bank: Washington DC.